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Modern society is challenged by a loss of efficiency in
national governance systems values, and lifestyles. Cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) discourse builds upon a
conception of organizational legitimacy that does not
appropriately reflect these changes. The problems arise
from the a-political role of the corporation in the con-
cepts of cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy, which are
based on compliance to national law and on relatively
homogeneous and stable societal expectations on the one
hand and widely accepted rhetoric assuming that all
members of society benefit from capitalist production on
the other. We therefore propose a fundamental shift to
moral legitimacy, from an output and power oriented
approach to an input related and discursive concept of
legitimacy. This shift creates a new basis of legitimacy and
involves organizations in processes of active justification
vis-a`-vis society rather than simply responding to the
demands of powerful groups. We consider this a step
towards the politicization of the corporation and attempt
to re-embed the debate on corporate legitimacy into its
broader context of political theory, while reflecting the
recent turn from a liberal to a deliberative concept of
democracy.
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Corporate legitimacy at stake
Legitimacy can be understood as the conformation
with social norms, values, and expectations (Oliver,
1996). It is subjectively perceived and ascribed to
actions or institutions by social construction (Berger
and Luckman, 1966). Legitimacy is vital for orga-
nizational survival as it is a precondition for the
continuous flow of resources and the sustained
support by the organization’s constituents (Parsons,
1960; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Weber, 1978).
Persons or institutions who lose legitimacy find it
difficult to enter into processes of social exchange as
their partners do not rely on their compliance with
social rules.
In recent years, many corporations have been in-
volved in conflicts with civil society and as a result
their legitimacy has been challenged. Financial
scandals, human rights violations, environmental
side-effects, collaboration with repressive regimes
and other problematic issues have not only threa-
tened the reputation of the involved firms but pro-
voked critical questions about the societal role of
business in general. Public trust in corporate morality
is on the decline (Sethi, 2002) and the firm’s activities
are intensively scrutinized by Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) (Doh and Teegen, 2004; Spar
and La Mure, 2003; Waddock, 2000). For NGO
Prof. Dr. Guido Palazzo is Assistant Professor for Business
Ethics at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland). He
graduated in Business Administration at the University of
Bamberg (Germany) and earned his PhD in Political Phi-
losophy (1999) from the University of Marburg (Germany).
His research interests are in Corporate Social Responsibility,
Corporate Branding, Democratic Theory and Organizational
Ethics.
Prof. Dr. Andreas Georg Scherer is director of the Institute for
Organization and Administrative Science (IOU) and holds
the Chair for Foundations of Business Administration and
Theories of the Firm at the University of Zurich (Switzer-
land). He has published six books. His work has appeared in
Academy of Management Review, Advances in Strategic
Management, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business
Ethics, M@n@gement, Management International Review,
Organization, organization Studies, and in numerous vol-
umes and German journals. Dr. Scherer is member of the
editorial boards of Business Ethics Quarterly, Organization,
and Organization Studies.
Journal of Business Ethics (2006) 66: 71–88  Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10551-006-9044-2
activists, multinationals’ brands have become the
target in the fight for decent labor, environmental
and human rights standards around the world. In
their eyes, companies with world-spanning networks
have become the potential enemies of public interest,
the distrusted actors, the ‘‘brand bullies’’ (Klein,
2000). Thus, legitimacy has become a very critical
issue for corporations, especially for those who
operate globally.
We suggest that current theorizing upon
corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not
adequately reflect these developments. The theo-
retical discourse builds mainly on the assumption of
an intact regulatory environment where national
legislation and the values of social communities
more or less clearly prescribe appropriate business
behavior. Corporations consider these rules and the
expectations of powerful stakeholder groups as
economic restrictions in their course towards
maximizing profits. Legitimacy is thus considered as
a resource to guarantee the corporation’s continued
existence. While even normative approaches to
business ethics often do not transcend this logic we
propose that under the conditions of globalization a
radical reformulation of the role of legitimacy is
overdue.
The paper is organized as follows. We first out-
line the concept of legitimacy in organization
studies. We then focus on the theoretical dilemma
of the current CSR debate and show how these
limits arise from the a-political role of the corpo-
ration in the mainstream conceptualization of cog-
nitive and pragmatic legitimacy. In the next section,
we describe the reasons for and consequences of the
proposed shift towards moral legitimacy. The focus
on moral legitimacy will alter the standards of
organizational legitimacy, since it involves organi-
zations in more and more processes of active jus-
tification vis-a`-vis society through communicative
engagement in public deliberation. We discuss this
as the politicization of the corporation. This argument
is followed by our attempt to re-embed the debate
on corporate legitimacy into its broader context
of political theory, reflecting the recent turn from
a liberal to a deliberative concept of democ-
racy. Subsequently, the practical challenges for
corporations that arise from their politicization are
outlined. A reflection on some caveats concludes
the paper.
Managing corporate legitimacy
Corporate legitimacy deals with the appropriate role
of corporations in society. Suchman defines legiti-
macy as ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or
appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’’ (Suchman,
1995, p. 574, emphasis in the original here omitted).
He distinguishes between three types of organiza-
tional legitimacy:
Pragmatic legitimacy results from the calculations of
self-interested individuals who are part of the orga-
nization’s audience, e.g., the corporation’s key
stakeholders or the wider public (Suchman, 1995).
These individuals will ascribe legitimacy to the
corporation as long as they perceive that they will
benefit from the corporation’s activities – e.g.,
through payment or cost reduction, or at least
indirectly through the output of the macro eco-
nomic system as a whole. Therefore, it is a key
challenge for the corporation to influence individ-
uals’ calculations and to persuade key stakeholders –
as well as the wider public – of the usefulness of its
output, procedures, structures and leadership
behavior (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). This can be
accomplished in various ways, e.g., by direct benefits
to constituents, by diligent stakeholder management,
by inviting stakeholders to participate in corporate
decision-making, or by strategic manipulation of
perceptions (e.g., through symbolic management or
instrumental public relations).
Cognitive legitimacy emerges, when the societal
context regards an organization and its output,
procedures, structures and leader behavior as inevi-
table and necessary and if acceptance is based on
some broadly shared taken-for-granted assumptions,
i.e., when ‘‘there is little question in the minds of
actors that it serves as a natural way to effect some
kind of collective action’’ (Hannan and Carroll,
1992, p. 34). Cognitive legitimacy operates mainly
at the subconscious level, making it difficult for the
corporation to directly influence and manipulate
perceptions strategically (Oliver, 1991; Suchman,
1995). Once a manipulation attempt is disclosed
cognitive legitimacy may collapse when sub-
conscious acceptance is substituted by explicit con-
sideration and opposition because practices are
perceived as unacceptable (see Ashforth and Gibbs,
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1990; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Therefore,
in many cases cognitive legitimacy can be managed
only indirectly and only to a minor degree (Oliver,
1991). Rather, a firm’s behavior may often result in a
simple adaptation to social expectations (see, e.g.,
Strand, 1983).
Moral legitimacy, finally, refers to conscious moral
judgments on the organization’s output, procedures,
structures and leaders. Moral legitimacy is socially
constructed by giving and considering reasons to justify
certain actions, practices, or institutions. It ‘‘reflects a
prosocial logic that differs fundamentally from nar-
row self-interest’’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). We
expect that moral concerns to some extent prove
resistant to self-interested manipulations and to
purely pragmatic considerations. Suchman describes
the moral legitimacy of organizations as the result of
‘‘explicit public discussion’’ and in his view corpo-
rations can win moral legitimacy only through their
vigorous participation in these discussions (Suchman,
1995, p. 585). The management of moral legiti-
macy, therefore, must be conceived of as deliberative
communication: Rather than manipulating and
persuading opponents the challenge is to convince
others by reasonable arguments.
An organization is perceived as legitimate, if it
pursues ‘‘socially acceptable goals in a socially
acceptable manner’’ (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990,
p. 177). In CSR research,1 a broad range of theories
is dealing with the concrete meaning of this rather
abstract demand. The role of corporations in society
is discussed under different headlines with the no-
tions of ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ (CSR),
‘‘corporate citizenship’’ (CC), ‘‘corporate sustain-
ability’’, ‘‘business ethics’’, or ‘‘stakeholder theory’’
dominating the debate. Despite the fact that there is
no terminological consistency, the core assumption
of all these concepts – sometimes defined in a more
instrumental line of argument, or in a more cate-
gorical way – is the unavoidability of normative
conformity with the social environment (e.g., Car-
roll, 1979, 1998; Maignan and Ferrell, 2000; Strand,
1983; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991).
Legitimacy, therefore, is the ‘‘yardstick’’ of the dis-
cussion in the CSR field (Sethi, 1975, p. 60).
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) suggest three factors
influencing corporate legitimacy: (a) the character-
istics of the societal environment that lead to a
specific set of demands vis-a`-vis a corporation,
(b) the characteristics of the organization that man-
ifest in a specific perception by the societal envi-
ronment and (c) the process by which legitimacy is
produced, in particular, how the corporation man-
ages legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). If corporate
legitimacy is based upon the characteristics of the
societal environment it can be assumed that deep
environmental changes have a significant influence
on the social expectancies towards organizations,
which again may lead to alterations in corporate
behavior (‘‘corporate social response’’, see Strand,
1983). Furthermore, if the conditions of social
acceptance change, the perception of the legitimacy
of a particular form of organization, e.g., corpora-
tions, or type of behavior, e.g., unconditional profit
seeking, may also change (see, e.g., Suddaby and
Greenwood, 2005). As a consequence, this may have
an impact on the process by which legitimacy is
produced and the suitability of different strategies of
‘‘managing legitimacy’’.
Our paper demonstrates that modern society is
indeed subject to significant change. We will discuss
these changes as the transition from stable industrial
society to postindustrial and postnational society
(Habermas, 2001) and suggest that business firms
today must reconsider their policies to maintain and
reproduce legitimacy. We will argue that the two
dominating approaches of cognitive and pragmatic
legitimacy do no longer suffice for protecting the
corporate licence to operate. More and more situa-
tions call for these approaches to be complemented
by moral access to corporate legitimacy.
Suchman (1995) proposes two main approaches
to ‘‘managing legitimacy’’ – strategic and institu-
tional. According to the institutional approach, orga-
nizational legitimacy results from the organization’s
cultural embeddedness that is displayed in its com-
pliance with generally accepted norms, values and
beliefs in society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Oliver, 1996). The
institutional approach describes organizational legit-
imacy as a continuous and often unconscious adap-
tation process in which the organization reacts to
external expectations. Therefore, with the institu-
tional approach, the potential to really ‘‘manage’’
legitimacy is limited (Suchman, 1995) and only
under certain conditions can organizations resist
adaptation (see, e.g., Oliver, 1991; Zald et al., 2005,
p. 264 ff.).
Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation’ 73
By contrast, the strategic approach treats legitimacy
as an ‘‘operational resource’’ (Suchman, 1995) that
can be managed and directly influenced by the
corporation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Seen from
this perspective, legitimacy is based on the corpo-
ration’s ability to ‘‘instrumentally manipulate and
deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal
support’’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). These strategic
efforts, however, often remain merely a symbolic
reaction to legitimacy pressures. Such organizations
deem it as important simply to appear consistent with
normative demands from their societal context.
They attempt to build symbolic links with other
values, symbols or persons that are highly respected
in order to create some reputational endorsement
effects (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Fombrun, 2001).
The successful management of organizational
legitimacy by both, passive compliance and active
manipulation, contributes to corporate survival.
Corporations are then perceived as meaningful,
predictable, and trustworthy and audiences are more
likely to supply resources to legitimate organizations
(Suchman, 1995). By contrast, organizations with
fragile legitimacy run the risk of being perceived as
unnecessary or irrational (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
They are less stable and persistent (Suchman, 1995).
We suggest that the current debate on a corpo-
ration’s societal responsibilities is built upon a dis-
cussion of organizational legitimacy that does not
appropriately reflect the conditions of a postnational
and pluralistic society. The strategic approach on the
one hand is overly focused on pragmatic legitimacy,
assuming that corporations have the power to stra-
tegically influence their societal context thus
manipulating the process of legitimacy ascriptions.
Following Suchman (1995), strategic manipulation
does not help in ensuring moral legitimacy or, at
least due to its short term effects, does not help to
stabilize it. The institutional approach on the other
hand takes cognitive legitimacy as its mainstream point
of reference. In our context, cognitive legitimacy is
based upon the idea of a nationally bound society
with a national governance system and a dense and
homogeneous cultural background of shared norms,
values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). However, as we
are going to demonstrate, the pluralization of modern
society (understood as the threefold process of indi-
vidualization, the devaluation of tradition, and the
globalization of society) results in a loss of cultural
homogeneity and erodes the normative taken-for-
grantedness as it is assumed in the concept of cog-
nitive legitimacy. If we follow Suchman’s thesis that
pragmatic legitimacy is too weak due to its limited
(group-specific) and ephemeral impact and if we
further assume that cognitive legitimacy is devalu-
ated through pluralization, moral legitimacy becomes
the decisive source of societal acceptance for cor-
porations in an increasing number of situations.
The theoretical dilemma of a thin concept
of corporate legitimacy
The main focus of the CSR debate is on instrumental
interpretations of corporate responsibility (see, e.g.,
Jones, 1995) and thus on pragmatic or cognitive
conceptions of legitimacy. The key argument is that
in capitalist societies business firms must earn profits
(Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Therefore, in the
long run, this objective is best served by adopting a
strategic approach towards CSR, i.e., rational man-
agers of business firms invest in CSR initiatives as
long as they earn extra profits (see, e.g., McWilliams
and Siegel, 2001). This is also implicitly assumed
within many empirical studies on corporate social
performance – corporate financial performance
relationship (see, e.g., Orlitzky et al., 2003). How-
ever, this strong dominance of instrumental inter-
pretations of CSR has come under pressure for its
theoretical limits (Matten and Crane, 2005). If CSR
is merely justified by a – more or less empirically
validated – potential to increase long-term profits,
the neoclassical rhetoric remains salient (see criti-
cally, Dubbink, 2004; Margolis and Walsh, 2003;
Ulrich, 2002; Vogel, 2005).
In order to transcend this narrow focus, there has
been a call for a more interdisciplinary approach to
organization studies with a more prominent role for
the humanities (Wicks and Freeman, 1998) and
political theory (Dubbink, 2004; Matten and Crane,
2005). The aim is to re-embed economy in its overall
ethico-political context (Ulrich, 2002). It has been
argued that the link between business and society is
‘‘inherently normative, because it seeks to explain
what corporations should or should not do on behalf
of the social good’’ (Swanson, 1999, p. 506).
There have been fruitful attempts to go beyond a
purely instrumental conceptualization of corporate
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responsibility and to place it in a broader ethical
context such as fundamental rights (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995) or the intrinsic worth of human
beings (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Freeman,
2002). In a recent contribution, an important step
was taken placing the debate on CSR into the
broader discourse of political theory. Matten and
Crane (2005) reinterpret the notion of corporate
citizenship (CC) based on its terminological use in
political theory. In their conceptualization of CC
they refer to the three dimensions of civic rights (social,
civil and political) and interpret the corporation’s
role as one of enabling, providing and channeling
these rights for citizens in situations where the state is
either unwilling or uncapable to protect them. Both
authors concede, though, that their conceptualiza-
tion remains merely descriptive in the sense that it
outlines the current practice of corporate engage-
ment rather than deriving the normative conse-
quences of the emerging changes in societal
governance structures (Matten and Crane, 2005; see,
critically, Oosterhout, 2005). However, their polit-
icized concept of CC is not yet integrated into the
more or less depoliticized discussion on CSR and its
limited concept of corporate legitimacy.
The theoretical narrowness and missing rigor of
the CSR debate can be traced back to the fact that it
mainly rests upon cognitive and pragmatic concepts
of corporate legitimacy and that it is not sufficiently
linked to the overarching debate on the (moral)
legitimacy of political institutions and processes (see
Habermas, 1996). The self-reference of organiza-
tional legitimacy theory separates it from an appro-
priate analysis of societal changes. As we will argue,
this theoretical separation is based upon the histori-
cally developed de-politicization of the corporation. By
political we mean activities ‘‘in which people orga-
nize collectively to regulate or transform some as-
pects of their shared social conditions, along with the
communicative activities in which they try to per-
suade one another to join such collective actions or
decide what direction they wish to take’’ (Young,
2004, p. 377).
The liberal idea of maintaining legitimacy of
political institutions and processes is linked to the
historically grown differentiation between the state
and society. Civic liberties have been developed as a
protection from the arbitrary use of power by
absolutist rulers. In medieval Europe, civic liberties
originally emerged as the relative freedom of towns
and their respective citizens from the influence of
feudal structures (see, e.g., Skinner, 1989). During
the Renaissance in Italy some towns established
these liberties and thus managed to contribute to the
modest independence of their citizens. However,
liberty was first understood as economic liberty, i.e., as
the freedom of economic choice and protection
from the ruler’s interferences. Accordingly, citizen
rights originally began as property rights and con-
tractual rights (MacPherson, 1962) and only over
time were these rights complemented by political
rights (i.e., participation in public will formation)
and social rights (i.e., right to education, health care,
welfare etc.) (Marshall, 1965).
In modern liberal society citizens enjoy a private
sphere of voluntary cooperation and exchange with
their fellow citizens, a sphere free of arbitrary
intervention by public institutions or third parties.
As a consequence, in its most radical form, modern
liberalism regards civil protection against arbitrary
coercion by public authorities or by fellow citizens as
the only common aim of individuals in a free society
(Hayek, 1960; Manin, 1987). Any step towards a
stricter regulation of private activity or expansion of
public authority is therefore suspect. Though some
additional state activities are considered necessary
preconditions of social integration (e.g., education,
monetary system, supply of public goods etc.)
(Friedman, 1962) the scope and intensity of state
activities has remained a highly controversial issue
(e.g., Block, 1994). The state apparatus has to be
controlled by democratic election and binding rules
so that the definition of public authority or the
execution of state power can be restricted to politi-
cally legitimate actions and institutions that are in the
interest of all citizens. Thus, in the democratic
constitutional state public authority is bound by the
rule of law and the free will of the people.2 Legal rules
and public policies derive their legitimacy from the
reason and will of the citizens whose decisions and
actions are supposed to be limited or affected by
them (Habermas, 1996). By contrast, the activities of
private actors, and corporations as the economic
extension of the private self, are not subjected to
immediate legitimacy demands, i.e., demands that go
beyond legal requirements and rules of common
decency (Friedman, 1962). As a result, the activities
of economic actors have been depoliticized (see also
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Scherer and Palazzo, forthcoming; Scherer et al.,
forthcoming):
The emphasis in economic theory on freedom of
choice in the market sphere suggests that legiti-
mization in the market sphere is ‘‘automatic’’ and
that markets thus avoid the typical legitimization
problem of the state (Peters, 2004, p. 1).
Therefore, in the dominating liberal concepts of
political theory, corporations are rather subjects of
legitimacy demands than objects to it. Within this
approach there is no additional obligation for pub-
licly justifying private economic activities beyond
the simple compliance with the basic legal and moral
rules of the surrounding society. Friedman’s (1970)
famous description of profit as the only social
responsibility of a corporation is a modern reflection
of these deeply ingrained overarching concepts of
liberal political legitimacy.
However, in capitalist societies the role of
business as a value creating (albeit not always
maximizing) institution is more or less taken for
granted. Corporate legitimacy thus mainly rests on
a cognitive conception of legitimacy as long as there
is ‘‘little question in the mind of actors’’ that the
business firm ‘‘serves as a natural way’’ of how
modern society works (see, Hannan and Carroll,
1992, p. 34). And even when this assumption is
contested economists hurry to maintain the capi-
talist rhetoric. By stating that ‘‘200 year’s worth of
work in economics and finance indicate that social
welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy
maximize total firm value’’ Jensen (2002, p. 239)
wants to sustain the perception that society will
benefit from the capitalist institution of the business
firm run by selfish entrepreneurs.3 He thus points
to the pragmatic legitimacy of the corporation.
Within this rhetoric there seems to be no need for
an additional responsibility of the business firm
beyond legal requirements and the economic
interests of the firm. Therefore, it has always been
regarded as unavoidable to deliver an economically
convincing answer to issues of CSR (see, e.g.,
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Paradoxically, with
their focus on the utility value of responsibility,
even authors who appeal for a broader view on
CSR often do not transcend that limited concep-
tual framework (see, critically, Margolis and Walsh,
2003; Vogel, 2005). Donaldson and Preston point
at the irony of the stakeholder model being justi-
fied within the analytical framework of economic
theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
There seems to be no reliable basis for a broader
understanding of corporate legitimacy for one basic
reason. The liberal and neoclassic understanding of
corporations as the extension of the private self
leaves no room for a genuine ethico-political inter-
pretation of corporate behavior. The traditional
division of labor between business and government
as it has been established during stable industrial
society manifests in Levitt’s argument that the role of
business is to make a profit and that social respon-
sibility is the task of government (Levitt, 1970; for a
more recent expression of this argument see Sun-
daram and Inkpen, 2004). This strict and deeply
engrained separation of economic and political
responsibilities explains the harsh critique against
CSR as it has been formulated by economists (see,
e.g., Economist, 2005; Friedman, 1962; Henderson,
2001; Jensen, 2002; Lal, 2003). Reich (1998, p. 17)
concludes that too much corporate interference in
non-business activities that are normally under the
responsibility of the state probably leads to a weak-
ening of the political system and to a problematic
‘‘politicization of the corporation’’. However, in our
view, the politicization of the corporation is an
unavoidable result of the changing interplay of
economy, government and civil society in a glob-
alizing world (Scherer and Palazzo, forthcoming;
Scherer et al., forthcoming). These societal changes
cast doubt upon the validity of the established
interpretation of the corporation as an extension of
the private self. Current concepts of organizational
legitimacy that refer either to a weak idea of a cor-
poration’s cognitive compliance or to the pragmatic
legitimacy provided by capitalist rhetoric will come
under pressure. In the following chapter, we
describe the shift from the industrial to the postin-
dustrial and postnational society and derive some
consequences for a politicized concept of organiza-
tional legitimacy.
The politicization of the corporation
De-politicized corporate legitimacy in its main-
stream understanding is based on the containment
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logic of the nation state with its limited geographic
expansion and distinctive normative tradition
(Kobrin, 2001). To use the differentiation as devel-
oped by Suchman, corporate legitimacy is strongly
linked to the taken-for-grantedness of a cognitive
access to legitimacy. This becomes obvious consid-
ering the arguments proposed in the debate on CSR
from a wide range of perspectives (see, critically,
Scherer and Palazzo, forthcoming). Carroll (1979,
p. 500) suggests that corporations’ responsibilities
derive from societal expectations ‘‘at a given point in
time’’, while Swanson (1999, p. 517) holds that
corporations have to align their activities with
‘‘broader community values’’. Epstein and Votaw
(1978, p. 3) argue that corporations must act con-
sistently ‘‘with the moral foundations of ... society’’,
and even Friedman (1970, p. 218) concludes that
corporations have to conform ‘‘to the basic rules of
the society, both that embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom’’. Accordingly, current
conceptualizations of CSR assume that legitimacy is
based on conformity with societal rules. This
assumption has become very problematic because of
the massive expansion of corporate activities into
different countries and cultures. On the global level
the idea of conformity to some more or less implicit
rules of some more or less contained social com-
munities is difficult to comprehend. On the global
playing field, there are no broadly accepted norma-
tive standards, neither in legal, nor in moral terms
(Habermas, 2001; Huntington, 1998).
As a consequence, legitimacy has become one of
the most critical business issues, especially for those
companies that operate globally. Kostova and Zaheer
(1999, p. 74) demonstrate that the power of multi-
nationals may result in economic advantages but turns
into a ‘‘source of vulnerability in non-market activi-
ties such as the maintenance of legitimacy’’. In a
globalized world, multinationals face a much higher
level of complexity compared with the more
homogeneous national context of the pre-globaliza-
tion age (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Meyer and
Scott, 1983). On the global level the legitimacy-
ascribing environment is not very homogeneous.
Rather one can observe a multiplicity of contradictory
legal and moral requirements (e.g., Kobrin, 2001;
Young, 2004). Therefore, it is difficult to identify
which of these demands will define the legitimacy of
organizational behavior. Oliver (1991) suggests that
the greater the multiplicity of constituent expectation
is the higher the likelihood of organizational resis-
tance towards these expectations. She holds that
under these conditions corporations may not respond
with adaptation but with strategies of compromise,
avoidance, defiance, or even manipulation in order to
maintain legitimacy.
The growing complexity of globalized social net-
works is accompanied by an internal pluralization of
postindustrial societies. These are characterized by an
ongoing process of individualization where the once
more or less homogeneous cultural life-world back-
ground becomes fragmented. Values, interests, goals
and lifestyles are pluralizing and societies struggle with
growing complexity and heterogeneity (Beck-
Gernsheim and Beck, 2002). The consequence for
discussions on legitimacy is quite obvious: Historical
transitions provoke legitimacy frictions (Suchman,
1995). Conclusively, Habermas (1996, p. 97) holds:
‘‘One no longer legitimates maxims, practices, and
rules of action simply by calling attention to the
contexts in which they were handed down’’.
Therefore, the taken-for-grantedness of a corpo-
ration’s societal background that was initially the
main source for cognitive legitimacy evaporates. But
at the same time legitimacy issues become more
salient – a phenomenon that can be explained by the
dynamics of globalization. Globalization does not
only macerate the cultural background of the nation
state, it furthermore leads to a vivid debate on the
interplay of state, economy and civil society (see,
e.g., Beck, 2000; Kobrin, 2001), which in turn re-
sults in re-conceptualizations of legitimacy in polit-
ical theory (e.g., Nanz and Steffek, 2004).
In recent years, it has been maintained that the
main threats to civic liberties no longer come from
state authorities but from private economic actors
(Beck, 1992; Deetz, 1995; Ulrich, 1993). Corpora-
tions have become ‘‘quasi-public’’ actors beyond
what Berle and Means had in mind when they de-
scribed the public character of corporations as the
result of stock company growth (cf. Berle and
Means, 1932, p. 333). Today, companies are quasi-
public actors because of the politicization of their
activities through unintended side-effects and the
lack of global regulation. Especially for transnation-
ally active corporations it has been argued that they
link private decisions with problematic collective
effects and bindings (Beck, 1992; Klein, 2000;
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Scherer, 2003; Ulrich, 1993). Private activities that
originally were considered politically neutral are
now loaded with more and more public demands.
Transnational corporations are morally scrutinized
along their supply chain, whether or not the criti-
cized activity is executed by the corporation itself or
by a legally independent supplier. Young (2003,
2004) emphasizes that the claim of responsibility as it
has been put on the agenda by the anti-sweatshop
movement is quite novel in the sense that it ‘‘in-
volves an argument that agents are responsible for
injustice by virtue of their structural connection to
it, even though they are not to blame for it’’
(Young, 2003, p. 40). This argument holds true for a
diverse set of human rights issues (e.g., slave labor,
child labor, forced labor, general working condi-
tions, environmental pollution, and collaboration
with repressive regimes).
In a world society without a world state there is
an emerging need to ‘‘re-set the standards by which
we assess legitimacy’’ (Zu¨rn, 2000, p. 190). Political
theory has only just discovered the corporation as a
political actor. Issues are defined as political if they
provoke public concern resulting from power. Power in
principle requires legitimacy (cf. Steffek, 2003;
Weber, 1978, p. 213). Corporations have become
‘‘the most important new political institution in the
contemporary political order’’ (Mitchel, 1986,
p. 208). The growing public influence of corpora-
tions raises questions about the public impact of
private authority on national sovereignty and dem-
ocratic governance (Habermas, 2001; Kobrin, 2001;
Rondinelli, 2002; Wolf, 2005). Multinational cor-
porations have developed an economic, social, and
political power that is comparable to the power of
nation states, as Epstein already noted in 1972
(Epstein, 1972). The debate on social responsibility
seems to be the result of a process of discussing
future rights and obligations of corporations in the
democratic order. Therefore, the purpose of the firm
and its place in society has to be redefined (Scherer,
2003; Walsh et al., 2003).
To ascribe a political role to corporations is not
only an abstract theoretical endeavor. Rather, it has
already gained practical importance by the reality of
corporate political engagement apparent today.
Corporations, especially transnational corporations,
already assume political responsibilities that once
where genuine governmental responsibilities: they
protect human rights or define and enforce social
and environmental minimum standards, they address
social misery such as AIDS, malnutrition, home-
lessness or illiteracy (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) and
engage in public health, education or social security
(Matten and Crane, 2005). Today, corporations
assume an ever expanding set of social responsibili-
ties including more and more activities that formerly
were regarded as activities of the political system
(see, e.g., Harman and Porter, 1997). In such con-
texts, the clear division of labor between the political
and business actors as it is included in both, the
pragmatic and the cognitive concept of legitimacy
becomes highly disputable.
Corporate legitimacy in a globalized world:
towards a communicative approach
In their recent paper, Matten and Crane (2005)
mention as one of the potential normative conse-
quences of their politicized approach to a corpora-
tion’s civic responsibility that corporate behavior
should probably be submitted to stricter democratic
accountability. We take up that assumption and pro-
pose a discursive interpretation of CSR focusing on
the important role of civic engagement and civic
interaction for processes of legitimacy. The call for
discourse and communicative ethics in the broad
field of corporate responsibility studies (e.g., Such-
man, 1995; Swanson, 1999; Wicks and Freeman,
1998) denotes a politicization of the corporation
since it opens corporate decision-making to civil
society discourses.
Our thesis is that in the current transition from
stable industrial society to a globalized postindustrial
society, cognitive legitimacy is eroding (e.g., share-
holder-value ideology, free and open market narra-
tives, normative homogeneity) while pragmatic
legitimacy (e.g., lobbyism, branding, strategic public
relations) provokes growing resistance (e.g., anti-
globalization movement, no logo movement).
Therefore, moral legitimacy has become the core
source of societal acceptance. Johnson and Holub
(2003) deliver an example for that thesis. After
September 11, 2001 the habit of moving to offshore
havens to lessen tax burdens was considered unpa-
triotic. Previously accepted business behavior sud-
denly became subject to critical public debate (for a
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critical discussion see, e.g., Palan, 2003). This clearly
shows, how established business practices can lose
their cognitive legitimacy very rapidly and instead
become highly politicized.
Moral legitimacy cannot be engineered, manipu-
lated or bought by organizations (Suchman, 1995),
even if it is quite a habitual approach of companies for
react to all kinds of legitimacy pressures by strategi-
cally adopting ‘‘certain highly visible and salient
practices that are consistent with social expectations
while leaving the essential machinery of the organi-
zation intact’’ (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 181).
These strategic efforts may secure the support of
some stakeholders for a while, but will definitely not
lead to moral legitimacy. On the contrary, the at-
tempt to engineer moral legitimacy, through sym-
bolic or strategic activities, such as instrumental
public relations or political lobbying (see, e.g., Hill-
man et al., 2004; Keim, 2001; Shell, 2004), may even
increase moral indignation and further reduce public
acceptance (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).
While theories of organizational legitimacy nor-
mally refer to the compliance with some taken-for-
granted societal background rules, we argue that the
idea of public acceptance can no longer be decou-
pled from public discourse. Instead, moral legitimacy
results from communication (Suchman, 1995).
Today, complying with the normative standards of
society has less to do with the habitualization of
existing norms or the engineering of corporate im-
age than with participating in public discourse and
providing good reasons and accepting better reasons.
The key questions, theories of organizational legiti-
macy have to answer, are the following:
1. If alignment with ‘‘broader community
values’’ (Swanson, 1999, p. 517) is the core
issue for corporate legitimacy, how can it be
established in a normative context that be-
comes transnationalized, fragmented, plural-
ized, more complex and less understandable
(see, e.g., Kostava and Zaheer, 1999)?
2. How can corporations identify the normative
standards of their societal environment and
what are they expected to do if these stan-
dards collide (see, e.g., Oliver, 1991)?
We suggest that against the background of non-
existent or insufficient institutions on the global
playing field, discourses offer an important contribu-
tion to processes of problem-solving (Steffek, 2003).
Dryzek comes to a similar conclusion (1999, p. 35):
Discourses are intertwined with institutions; if
formal rules constitute institutional hardware,
then discourses constitute institutional software.
In the international system, the hardware is not
well developed, which means that the software
becomes more important still.
A turn towards moral legitimacy, as it is suggested
here, implicates a turn from the economic, utility-
driven, and output-oriented view on CSR to a polit-
ical, communication-driven, and input oriented con-
cept of organizational responsibility. The priority of
the political is expressed in a strong link between
corporate decision-making and processes of will-
formation in a corporation’s stakeholder network
(Wicks and Freeman, 1998; Young, 2003).
According to Swanson, a communicative approach to
moral conflicts could offer conceptual background
for the exchange of value-based information be-
tween a corporation and its societal environment
(Swanson, 1999). In a similar vein, Calton and Payne
deliver a communicative definition of a stakeholder
network, describing it as ‘‘an interactive field of
discourse’’ (Calton and Payne, 2003) which they
place in the context of the emerging view of orga-
nizations as interconnected conversations (e.g.,
Calton and Kurland, 1996; Deetz, 1995; Kuhn and
Ashcraft, 2003; Wicks and Freeman, 1998).
If normative conflicts can no longer be solved by
referring to a shared background of values and tra-
ditions, communication becomes the sole source of
peaceful interaction and mutual recognition (cf.
Habermas, 2001, p. 74). This is especially true in a
context of non-existing or weak global governance
mechanisms. We therefore propose to embed orga-
nizational legitimacy theory and derived discussions
on CSR in a communication-based approach to political
theory. What will such an approach look like?
Communicative legitimacy in the theory
of deliberative democracy
Modern theories of political legitimacy link the
rightfulness of domination to the consent of the
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governed citizens. According to Max Weber, legiti-
macy describes a social order that disposes of ‘‘the
prestige of being considered binding’’ (Weber, 1978,
p. 31). The binding character of a social order is
based upon its capacity to produce ‘‘rationally
debatable reasons’’ (Weber, 1978, p. 979). From a
pragmatic perspective organizational legitimacy is
mainly reconstructed following utilitarian rationality
(Suchman, 1995). We describe the interpretation of
civic rights as property rights as one explanation for
this phenomenon. A second explanation might come
from the fact that in the overarching discourse on
political theory itself, the same output-oriented
conceptualization of legitimacy has dominated the
debate for decades (Dahl, 1967; Easton, 1969; Ep-
stein, 1972; Hurst, 1970). In liberal theory, the
binding character of a democratic social order is ex-
plained by its institutional efficiency. Democracy is
understood as a system of election, vote-aggregation,
and representation and civic interaction is conceived
as market-structured (cf. Elster, 1986; Habermas,
1998b, p. 239). The citizens have to be unburdened
from political engagement and the state is organized
in a Schumpeterian political system of competitive
elitism. From a liberal point of view, the political role
of the citizen is reduced to the decision act at the polls
where electorates express their preferences while the
process of developing and changing these preferences
is neglected (see, Elster, 1986). Therefore, legitimacy
in this case is less based on civic self-determination
and more on the utility value of the political system
(cf. Habermas, 1998b, p. 248).
However, in recent years, liberal concepts of
vote-aggregation and bargaining have come under
the pressure of societal pluralization. Pluralization,
understood as the threefold process of individuali-
zation, the devaluation of tradition and the global-
ization of society as it was explained above, results in
a loss of traditional certainties. The fragmentation of
cultural homogeneity provokes ‘‘the intrusion of
reflection into life histories and cultural traditions’’
(Habermas, 1996, p. 97) thereby leading to a
growing awareness of civic autonomy and self-
determination. A linguistic turn in contemporary
political philosophy has been regarded as an
unavoidable consequence of pluralization (Dryzek,
2001) and is discussed in the deliberative approach to
political theory:
The conception of deliberative democracy ... puts
moral reasoning and moral disagreement back at
the center of everyday politics. It reinforces and
refines the practice of moral argument that pre-
vails in ordinary political life – the way in which
citizens deal with moral disagreement in middle
democracy. Its principles show citizens and their
representatives how to live with moral disagree-
ment in a morally constructive way (Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996, p. 661).
The concept of deliberative democracy covers ‘‘any one
of a family of views according to which the public
deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core
of legitimate political decision-making and self-
government’’ (Bohman, 1998, p. 401). Where
liberal theory is focused on the output of democracy
(societal welfare), deliberative democracy is focusing
on the input (civic participation). Accordingly,
legitimacy is regarded as the result of a process of
public deliberation (Dryzek, 2001; Manin, 1987;
Steffek, 2003). It is based on an ‘‘interactive ratio-
nality’’ (Benhabib, 1993, p. 6) that may lead to
‘‘a free and reasoned agreement among equals’’
(Cohen, 1989, p. 22). Collective outcomes of
deliberation derive their legitimacy from the degree to
which they reflect the plurality of competing dis-
courses in the public sphere (Dryzek, 2001). In
contrast to liberal processes of bargaining, where
only threats and incentives lead to interest-aggrega-
tion of strategic actors, deliberation is at least partly
based on common goals, values and goodwill (Zu¨rn,
2000). Deliberation is a process through which
participants address their conflicts, share information,
exchange arguments and make decisions. In the
arena of political deliberation, opposing positions are
weighed by exchanging good reasons (Manin,
1987). Deliberation presupposes the willingness to
expose one’s position to validity claims and the
motivation to strive for mutual understanding (see
Habermas, 1990, pp. 44 and 58; 1993, p. 56). In
contrast to bargaining, participants are ready to
change their opinions during discourse (Manin,
1987). As a precondition, deliberation includes a
concern for the well-being of the whole and that
sense of community is reinforced by the process of
deliberation itself (Zu¨rn, 2000). Processes of delib-
eration lead to better and broader accepted political
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decisions and a deeper mutual understanding of the
involved stakeholders and thus contribute to sus-
taining moral legitimacy. These positive effects can
even be expected under suboptimal discourse con-
ditions (Fung, 2005).
In the concept of deliberative democracy, legiti-
macy is based on the institutional design of discursive
arenas and the procedural design of public will-for-
mation (Dryzek, 1999, p. 43; Habermas, 1996).
Accordingly, a vivid public sphere is a core aspect of
deliberative democracy. The public sphere can be
regarded as a communicative network in which
positions are synthesized into ‘‘bundles of topically
specified public opinions’’, echoing the problems of
citizens (Habermas, 1996, p. 360). The linguistic
construction of the public sphere is achieved by
more or less spontaneously emerging movements
and civil society associations that map, filter, amplify,
bundle and transmit private problems, values and
needs (see Habermas, 1996, p. 367).
The discussion on deliberative democracy is
fueled by the rising significance of civil society actors
(see, e.g., Boli and Thomas, 1999; Keck and Sik-
kink, 1998; Smith et al., 1997) and the growth in
NGOs’ activities (Wulfson, 2001). Nanz and Steffek
(2004) suggest that the shrinking power of the
political system is – at least partly – compensated by a
politicization of civil society itself. This phenome-
non has also been described as a ‘‘globalization from
below’’ (Beck, 2000, p. 68). Civic political eman-
cipation does not only affect the dynamic between
civil society and the state. Under the ‘‘postnational
condition’’ (Habermas, 2001), even the link be-
tween civil society and the economy is politicized.
Where states lose their power, NGOs start to deal
directly with the new owners of power, the cor-
porations. Many observers point to the increasing
visibility of anti-corporate activities and emphasize
the growing importance and influence of individual
and collective civil society actors (Hertz, 2001; Spar
and La Mure, 2003; Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003).
These initiatives result in a direct pressure of civil
society activists on economic actors and have been
described as ‘‘paragovernmental activities’’ (Dryzek,
1999, p. 44). Apparently, the rising power of cor-
porations and the comparable powerful reactions by
civil society actors lead to a changing dynamic be-
tween state, economy, and civil society groups
(Kobrin, 2001). The traditional institutional order as
established during stable industrial society experi-
encing dramatic changes. Significant alterations in
global politics result in de-centering state authority
and increasing political power of originally non-
political and non-state actors such as transnational
corporations, NGOs, and intergovernmental orga-
nizations (Kobrin, 2001; Maragia, 2002). As a con-
sequence, legitimacy in a transnational context has to
be considered with regard to the emerging gover-
nance institutions and procedures beyond or above the
nation state (Steffek, 2003; Wolf, 2005). Therefore,
business firms have to satisfy larger demands for
justifying their legitimacy.
Actors from the economic systems are immedi-
ately confronted with moral legitimacy claims,
whereas during stable industrial society these claims
are, as described, more or less hidden in implicit
consensus on traditional customs and values (cogni-
tive legitimacy) or the more or less accepted capi-
talist rhetoric of corporate economic activities
contributing to the public good (pragmatic legiti-
macy). Today, citizens look deeply into the opera-
tions of a company and they enforce transparency
and accountability where it is not delivered on a
voluntary basis (Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003). NGOs
become the mediating forces between the market
and morality (Dubbink, 2004). In a deliberative
concept of democracy as outlined here, the moral
context of corporate activities is no longer based on
societal rules which are taken-for-granted, but rather
on the public discourses of civil society. And the more
active citizens in their different stakeholder roles
become, the greater the need to deal with their
demands in a discursive way. Stating this we are able
to conceptualize the process by which corporate
moral legitimacy must be reproduced: by placing
corporations into public communication network.
A discursive approach to organizational legitimacy
leads to a politicized concept of CSR. Unlike the
strategic approach to instrumental politics, which
attempts to manipulate the system of political gov-
ernance (see, e.g., Hillman et al., 2004; Keim, 2001)
and which may eventually lead to pragmatic legiti-
macy, the deliberative politics approach goes beyond
narrow self-interested manipulations and purely
pragmatic considerations (Suchman, 1995). The
challenge of communicative access to legitimacy is
to engage in true dialogue, to convince others of the
validity of one’s arguments but not to persuade or
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manipulate by means of strategic instrumentaliza-
tion. However, at the same time the communicative
approach does not aim at overburdening the cor-
poration with political demands. Friedman (1962,
1970) feared that normative demands beyond profit
making would overburden the economic actors and
lead to a too densely regulated system of corporate
control. As a result, efficiency would be reduced and
individual freedom which mainly manifests in
property rights would be endangered. However, in a
postindustrial and postnational world in which
unintended side-effects become a more serious
threat to the individual freedom of the affected and
in which the taken-for-granted context of normative
control is eroding, the two main pillars of the neo-
classical shareholder-ideology collapse.
However, to regard the corporation as a political
player whose legitimacy is based on civil society
discourses does not mean that corporations should
completely transcend the economic logic. Their
viability still depends on their ability to make a profit
(Steinmann and Scherer, 2000). We argue that the
societal limits to profit making have shifted from
simply complying to nation state regulations and
adhering to a more or less implicit set of coherent
societal expectations as it was envisioned by Fried-
man (1962, 1970) to a more complex communica-
tive process of accountability where these limits are
defined and redefined in a continuous process of
deliberative discourse. This shift also signifies the
necessary transition from a cognitive and pragmatic ap-
proach to a moral approach in more and more legitimacy
challenges of corporate decision-making.
A deliberative concept of organizational legiti-
macy would, however, acknowledge the priority of
systemic routine. This means that we still consider
market transactions as the primary mode of coordi-
nation in the globalized society of anonymous
individuals. However, in order to domesticate
market forces even in light of the shrinking power of
nation state governance and the loss of the implicit
consensus of shared cultural rules and values we need
new forms of governance to establish a new legiti-
mate political order that goes beyond the traditional
forms of democratic nation state regulation (Scherer
and Palazzo, 2005; Scherer et al., forthcoming;
Wolf, 2005). The concept of deliberative discourse is
an attempt to draw the outline of such a new form of
governance acknowledging the contributions that
could be made by public and by private actors. The
responsibility of civil society is, e.g., to question, to
criticize and to publicize whenever the conse-
quences of market behavior appear to be problem-
atic (Dryzek, 1999; Steinmann and Scherer, 2000).
As these remarks may indicate, it is not our intent to
develop an entirely different, revolutionary concept
of societal integration: ‘‘Communicative power is
exercised in the manner of a siege ... without
intending to conquer the system itself’’ (Habermas,
1996, p. 486 et seq.; for a rigorous critique of this
premise see Noonan, 2005). Despite the day-to-day
priority of economic routine, corporations must
remain open to critical deliberation in principle –
their primary source of societal acceptance:
The issue of legitimacy does not arise unless an
order is contested. An order is contested when,
for instance, new practice emerges, new rules are
promulgated, or new actors rise and demand
participation in a system that traditionally kept
them outside (Maragia, 2002, p. 312).
Conclusion
Management theory has paid too little attention to
the relationship between business and society (Walsh
et al., 2003) or interpreted that relationship in a
purely economic way (Perrow, 2000; Vogel, 2005).
The present paper is an attempt to contribute to the
discussion on CSR with an alternative approach,
i.e., a discursive reinterpretation of organizational
legitimacy. However, our political conception of the
relationship between business and society is not
without problems. We conclude our paper by out-
lining three potential caveats: non-discursive activ-
ism, dissensual communication, and media effects.
Non-discursive activism
Civil society activism is not always based on
or aiming at public deliberation. Civil society
activists use a broad range of non-discursive strat-
egies in order to influence corporate behavior. Hill
and Jones (1992) distinguish between legalistic
approaches (e.g., NGOs file lawsuits against exit
strategies (e.g., NGOs promote boycotts of a
corporation’s products), and voice strategies (NGOs
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try to stimulate awareness, e.g., through demon-
strations in front of corporate facilities or street
marches). Activists often refuse to participate in
civil society discourses, because they fear the
overwhelming influence of existing structural
inequalities such as the power of a corporation on
the outcome of such a discourse (Young, 2001).
We concede that non-communicative strategies of
resistance are sometimes necessary for creating
public awareness and corporate willingness to par-
ticipate in public debates (Oliver, 1991). The fact
that human rights conditions in the sweatshops of
the apparel industry are highly ranked on the
agenda of civil society discourse is the result of
initial pressure, not of deliberation (see, e.g.,
Zadek, 2004). But pressure is as inappropriate as
corporate lobbyism in the production of solutions
based on moral legitimacy. In our paper, we ana-
lyzed and criticized non-discursive strategies and
communications of corporations. However, it
remains necessary, to critically analyze the role and
behavior of non-discursive activism in the arena of
public will-formation, too (see, e.g., Spar and
La Mure, 2003).
Dissensual communication
Conflicts between corporations and their societal
environment are more and more based on identity
and values instead of interests (Rowley and Mold-
oveanu, 2003). As a consequence, shared solutions in
the form of a consensus or even a compromise
become quite improbable (see McCarthy, 1996).
Activists who fight against abortion, genetically
modified food, or child labor would regard any
compromise with the targeted corporation as a threat
to their personal integrity, as a betrayal of ‘‘some...
deeply held ethical beliefs about the meaning and
value of life’’ (McCarthy, 1996, p. 341). Corpora-
tions sometimes face the difficult situation that civil
society activists are ready for discourse, but not for
shared solutions. In value-based conflicts, discourse
may not solve the tension between contradictory
demands. In the extreme case, communication
might even fuel the conflict. The same effect might
arise from situations in which transnational corpo-
rations are confronted with contradictory moral
demands from different cultures. A discursive ap-
proach to organizational legitimacy will have to deal
with the growing importance of dissensual com-
munication in pluralizing and globalizing societies
(see, e.g., Steinmann and Scherer, 1998).
Media effects
The mass media play a crucial role as information
gatekeepers. They sometimes pull public discourses
into certain directions. The confrontation between
Shell and Greenpeace in the Brent Spar case illus-
trates how mass media support of the Greenpeace
position emotionalized and manipulated the dis-
course. However, the manipulative and gatekeeping
power of TV channels and newspapers might be
compensated by the Internet with its democratizing
effect. It does not only deliver additional sources of
information, it also plays a key role in the formation
of civil society associations and their campaign
strategies. Therefore, the role of the mass media and
the Internet in a deliberative theory of organizational
legitimacy has to be conceptualized in more detail.
Our paper aims at proposing a political fundament
for the discussion on corporate legitimacy. The need
for a political and communicative re-conceptuali-
zation of organizational legitimacy derives from the
erosion of its implicit link to the overarching societal
context. The cognitive focus of normative compli-
ance is devaluated by the ongoing process of dena-
tionalization. While the mainstream debate on CSR
regards the corporation as more or less depoliticized,
we show how it becomes strongly politicized in the
postnational governance dynamic. However, with
the dominating neoclassical rhetoric of management
theory it seems difficult to cope with the changing
normative context and to advocate CSRs beyond
economic performance and legal compliance with
the same rigor (Scherer et al., forthcoming).
Our proposal to shift the attention from cognitive
and pragmatic to moral legitimacy is not contradic-
tory to Suchman’s (1995) view on organizational
legitimacy. The idea of moral legitimacy as a dis-
cursive concept is already part of his conceptualiza-
tion, but Suchman does not go beyond the mere
formulation of the idea. We contribute to the debate
by connecting organizational legitimacy to a delib-
erative approach of political theory thus elaborating
on the idea of a communicatively constructed
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corporate legitimacy. We place the idea of corporate
acceptance into the communicative network of
public communication. The politicization of the
corporation seems to be the unavoidable conse-
quence of the emerging democratic governance in a
world society without a world state. Theories of
CSR will have to operate under a postnational
constellation.
Notes
1 We use ‘‘CSR research’’ as an umbrella term for the
notions further mentioned in the text.
2 Whether one principle should be priviledged over
the other is a matter of debate in political philosophy.
Liberal authors point to the natural rights with which
any individual is born, while republican or communi-
tarian inspired authors suggest that any right and its
meaning ultimately originates in processes of social
interaction and construction (see, e.g., Habermas,
1998a, on the internal relation between the rule of law
and democracy).
3 It is not necessary here to further touch upon the
principal-agency issue as it is the aim of principal agen-
cy theory to explain the conditions under which man-
agers behave as if they were entrepreneurs, i.e. the
owners of the firm.
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